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Abstract—A social approach can be exploited for the Internet of Things (IoT) to manage a large number of connected objects. These
objects operate as autonomous agents to request and provide information and services to users. Establishing trustworthy relationships
among the objects greatly improves the effectiveness of node interaction in the social IoT and helps nodes overcome perceptions of
uncertainty and risk. However, there are limitations in the existing trust models. In this paper, a comprehensive model of trust is
proposed that is tailored to the social IoT. The model includes ingredients such as trustor, trustee, goal, trustworthiness evaluation,
decision, action, result, and context. Building on this trust model, we clarify the concept of trust in the social IoT in five aspects such as
(1) mutuality of trustor and trustee, (2) inferential transfer of trust, (3) transitivity of trust, (4) trustworthiness update, and (5)
trustworthiness affected by dynamic environment. With network connectivities that are from real-world social networks, a series of
simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the social IoT operated with the proposed trust model. An experimental IoT
network is used to further validate the proposed trust model.
Index Terms—Social Internet of Things, task delegation, trust model, trustworthiness evaluation, trust inference, trust transfer,
trustworthiness update.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is evolving as a new generation
of information network and service infrastructure, creating oppor-
tunities for more integration of the physical world into computer-
based systems. As a large number of objects are connected and the
things get smart, it is indispensable for the interaction paradigm
of the IoT to adopt a social approach [1], [2], [3]. In a social IoT,
the objects are capable of establishing social relationships with
others and are allowed to have their own social networks. The
inter-object interactions occur on the objects’ social network. The
social relationships among the users and owners are taken into
account during the design phase of the IoT [4], [5]. The objects
in the social IoT operate as autonomous agents to request and
provide information and services to users while maintaining their
individuality.
The social IoT has its advantages. First, the structure of the
social network can be shaped as required to guarantee network
navigability and scalability. As the number of objects connected to
the network increases exponentially, the searching space becomes
enormous [4], [6]. The heterogeneous nature and the large scale
of contextual data make the IoT even more complicated [7].
The social IoT can effectively perform the discovery of objects
and services. It navigates a social network of “friendly” objects
instead of depending on typical Internet discovery tools which
do not scale well. Second, models designed to study social
networks can be used to address issues of the social IoT. These
models are typically used for extensive networks with complicated
and dynamic interconnections. They can reveal how each object
establishes social relationships and searches for information and
services by crawling the networks. Third, a level of trustworthiness
can be established for leveraging the degree of interaction among
objects that are friendly in the social IoT. The social objects
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participate in a relationship only when there is enough trust.
The objects can effectively offer services to their owners by
autonomously cooperating with other objects with which they have
good relationships.
Trust relationships can exist between objects, making objects
only respond to service requests from familiar nodes hence reduc-
ing exposure to malicious nodes [8]. On the other hand, when
a task is transferred to a destination IoT agent for execution,
the initiator of the task completely loses control of the task.
The task executor can easily manipulate the task code and attack
the service requestor [9]. Trust management helps the social IoT
agents overcome perceptions of uncertainty and risk.
Most of the work to date focuses on narrow aspects of trust
framework, trust evaluation, and trust transfer and inference [10].
There are still some misconceptions of trust in the social IoT
and limitations in the existing trust models. Developing a proper
trust model is imperative for the design and implementation of
the social IoT. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive model
of trust for the social IoT and discuss in detail the concepts of
trust among objects. Building on these concepts, we highlight five
limitations of the existing trust models and clarify the distinctive
features of trust in the social IoT. The main contributions of this
work are as follows.
1) A comprehensive model of trust is provided that is tai-
lored to the social IoT. In the social IoT, trust is more than
a single concept such as trustworthiness. It is described
as a dynamic process rather than a static notion. It has a
relational construct of six basic ingredients, i.e., (1) the
trustor, (2) the trustee, (3) the goal, (4) the evaluation of
trustworthiness, (5) the decision and its subsequent action
and result, and (6) the context.
2) Five limitations of current models of trust are discussed
and the distinctive features of the trust model for the
social IoT are clarified. These five different aspects of
the trust model include (1) mutuality of trustor and
trustee, (2) inferential transfer of trust with analogous
tasks, (3) transitivity of trust, (4) trustworthiness updated
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with delegation results, and (5) trustworthiness affected
by dynamic environment.
3) Because of features of the proposed model, it has the
following merits: (1) providing protection of the trustee,
(2) exploring information from characteristics and better
using results of historical assignment, (3) offering two
different scheme for transitivity of trust, (4) evaluating
trust not only with positive factors but also with negative
factors, and (5) adapting to dynamic environments.
4) A series of simulations and experiments are carried out
to evaluate the performance of the social IoT which is
operated with the proposed trust model. The network
connectivities of three real-world social networks, i.e.,
Facebook network, Google+ network, and Twitter, are
used to construct the social IoT network. Some character-
istics of these real-world social network nodes are used
as social IoT node characteristics. An experimental IoT
network is also used to validate the proposed trust model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related work
on trust models is summarized in Section 2. In Section 3, a general
model of trust is proposed for the social IoT. Six basic ingredients
of the trust model are described. In Section 4, the limitations of
the existing trust models are listed. Accordingly, we clarify the
distinctive features of the trust model proposed for the social IoT.
In Section 5, we evaluate the performance of the social IoT with
methods based on the proposed trust model and compare it with
common shortcomings of some models that are used in real-world
systems [11], [12], [13]. Finally, conclusions and discussions are
provided in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Trust Models of IoT
Recently, interest has piqued in the trust aspect of the IoT. There
are some interesting models in this area. Deshpande et al. devel-
oped a social network-based model to enable access controlled
sharing of device capabilities in the IoT [14]. A prototype was
implemented that uses public APIs to show the feasibility of the
model. Daubert et al. proposed a model that establishes a relation
between information, privacy, and trust [15]. The model balances
between trust in the service provider and the need for privacy of
individuals.
Many different aspects can be taken into consideration for
calculating and modeling the trust, such as energy consumption,
latency, and social relationships. Duan et al. proposed an energy-
aware trust derivation scheme, which aims to minimize energy
consumption and latency of the network under the premise of
security assurance [16]. A trust derivation dilemma game was
introduced into the trust derivation process to reduce the overhead
of the network. Chen et al. proposed an adaptive IoT trust protocol
for Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)-based IoT systems [17].
For measuring social similarity and filtering trust feedback based
on social similarity, they considered three social relationships,
i.e., friendship, social contact, and community of interest. The
effectiveness of the proposed adaptive IoT trust protocol was
demonstrated through service composition application scenarios
in SOA-based IoT environments when malicious nodes performed
self-promoting, bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, and opportunistic
service attacks.
Better understanding of the trust can facilitate the applications
in IoT. Kantarci et al. presented a Trustworthy Sensing for Crowd
Management scheme for public safety [13]. Public safety authority
can use sensor data of the smartphones if effective incentives exist
for the users to provide the service.
2.2 Trust Models of P2P Systems, Recommendation
Systems, and Other Related Systems
There is some excellent literature on trust models in related
areas such as peer-to-peer (P2P) systems and recommendation
systems. P2P is a suitable structure to realize the IoT. Related
works in P2P systems can help us better understand the trust
in IoT. Xiong and Liu introduced three basic trust parameters
and two adaptive factors in computing trustworthiness of peers,
namely, the feedback a peer receives from others, the total number
of transactions a peer performs, the credibility of the feedback
sources, the transaction context factor, and the community context
factor [18]. The feedback from those peers with higher credibility
is weighted more than those with lower credibility.
Dewan et al. investigated Reputation Systems for P2P net-
works, i.e., a more ambitious approach to protecting the P2P
network without using any central component, and thereby har-
nessing the full benefits of the P2P network [19]. The provider in
their protocol is accountable for all past transactions, and cannot
maliciously meddle with the transaction history by adding or
deleting any recommendation.
Nitti et al. proposed a subjective model and an objective model
to evaluate the object’s trustworthiness that are derived from social
networks and P2P technologies [20]. The subject approach has a
slower transitory response. However, it is practically immune to
certain malicious behaviors.
Recommendation systems are common in recent years which
seek to predict the preference. Many aspects are considered in
recommendation. Zhan et al. introduced some shared character
factors, such as credible feedback of digital contents, feedback
weighting factor and user share similarity, and proposed a recom-
mendation model [12]. Chen et al. proposed a generalized cross-
domain collaborative filtering framework which integrates social
network information seamlessly with cross-domain data [21].
Recommendation using cross-domain data was carried out without
decomposition. Usually, the higher a user’s expectation is prone
to result in the lower a user’s satisfaction. Therefore, Meng et
al. suggested that the evaluation vector should be adjusted so as to
evaluate the server’s service ability more accurately [22].
Trust is one of the most important factor in the recom-
mendation systems. Can and Bhargava defined three main trust
metrics, i.e., reputation, service trust, and recommendation trust,
to precisely measure trustworthiness [23]. Guo et al. suggested that
not only the explicit but also the implicit influence of both rating
and trust should be taken into consideration in a recommendation
model [24].
The reputation or the trust can be subdivided. Fan et al. de-
fined two reputation values, i.e., recommended reputation value
and recommending reputation value, for each peer to reflect
the resource service behavior and trust recommending behavior,
respectively [25]. Zhong et al. proposed a trust model which
distinguishes integrity trust from competence trust [26].
He et al. identified the unique features of medical sensor net-
works and introduced relevant node behaviors, such as transmis-
sion rate and leaving time, into trust evaluation to detect malicious
nodes [11]. Das et al. presented a dynamic trust computation
model, named Secured Trust, to cope with the strategically altering
behavior of malicious agents [27].
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These works have greatly enriched one’s understanding of the
challenges of the trust model. However, the concept of trust in
the IoT is still obscure, and there are some misunderstandings
when frameworks or protocols are designed. Fortunately, trust has
been well studied in sociology [28]. Although we cannot directly
apply those theories to the IoT, those theories can help us better
understand trust in the IoT.
3 A GENERAL MODEL OF TRUST IN THE SOCIAL
INTERNET OF THINGS
Before clarifying the characteristics of trust and discussing the
limitations of current trust models, we provide a general model of
trust in the social IoT. As there is not yet a clear and prevailing
notion of trust even in cognitive and social sciences, we layout a
domain-specific definition of trust that is tailored to the social IoT.
Definition. In the social IoT, trust is a process of the trustor, based
on the evaluation and expectation of the trustee’s competence and
willingness, comprising the intention, deciding to delegate tasks
to the trustee, and exploiting the outcome of the trustee’s action
for fulfilling a goal. The trustor accepts the risk of becoming
vulnerable by the act of entrusting the trustee in a certain context.
The evaluation of trustworthiness is mutual between the trustor
and the trustee. It depends on the task context and is affected by
the behavior consequences and the environment uncertainty.
Trust in the social IoT is a relational construct of six basic
ingredients: (1) the trustor, (2) the trustee, (3) the goal, (4) the
evaluation of trustworthiness, (5) the decision and its subsequent
action and result, and (6) the context.
3.1 Trustor and Trustee
Trustor, X , in the IoT is an intentional agent that has a goal, its
own need, and attitudes toward other agents and their actions.
Based on its beliefs towards other agents and its cognition of
the situation and the environment, the trustor can generate and
delegate tasks and evaluate the results. Trustee, Y , in the IoT is
an agent equipped with devices that is capable of causing some
effect as the outcome of its behavior. In the case of social IoT, the
trustee is also a cognitive agent. Trustee Y is another autonomous
agent perceived by trustorX and is beyondX’s direct control. The
behaviors of both the trustor and the trustee have to be consistent
with their trust relationship.
3.2 Goal
The trustor relies on the trustee’s action to achieve a goal and/or
to meet its own need. With a goal, the trustor has the motivation to
delegate tasks to the trustee and has the expectation of the result.
The expectation is positive if the trustee can produce the desired
result which is favorable to achieving such a goal. The expectation
is negative if the result imposes frustration and threat against the
goal. The trustor intends to exploit the positive outcome of the
trustee’s action and is concerned to make decisions accordingly.
In the case of social IoT, trustor X has no complete control
over trustee Y . Trustor X takes risk by delegating tasks to trustee
Y and becomes vulnerable. The trustor is vulnerable in terms of
potential failure to achieve the goal. The trustee may not perform
the action or the action may not have the desired result. There is
uncertainty in the trustor’s knowledge of the trustee. In addition,
when depending on the trustee for achieving the goal, the trustor
is exposed to the potential damage inflicted by the trustee.
3.3 Evaluation of Trustworthiness
The trustor evaluates the trustee about its trustworthiness to do its
share for achieving some goal. Traditionally, trustworthiness is a
property of the trustee perceived by the trustor.
In the social IoT, both the trustor and the trustee can be cogni-
tive therefore the evaluation of trustworthiness is mutual. Trustor
X evaluates trustee Y and attributes to Y an attitude and an
expected action for achieving X’s goal. At the same time, trustee
Y may evaluate trustor X and attribute to X a trustworthiness
value in Y ’s best interest, e.g., not to be maliciously exploited.
There are two types of trustworthiness evaluations in the social
IoT, i.e., the pre-evaluation and the post-evaluation. The trustor
and the trustee pre-evaluate each other before the delegation action
based on the context and past experiences. The trustor tries to
identify the best potential trustee and the trustee makes an effort
to recognize malicious intents. After the delegation action, the
trustor and the trustee perform post-evaluations according to the
results and the environment. The evaluation is not only based on
the success rate but also on the gain, the damage, the cost, and the
environment.
3.4 Decision, Action and Result
In the social IoT, trust is a causal process that includes a decision,
an action, and a result. Trust is not merely an evaluation of or an
attitude toward another agent. It has its behavioral aspects in the
decision making of the trustor and the subsequent course of action
of the trustee [28]. The trustor evaluates the potential trustees,
compares the expected outcomes, calculates its risks and costs,
and creates an intension to delegate. Upon its decision, the trustor
delegates and relies on the trustee’s action to produce the desired
result. If the trustee’s behavior is predictable, the result of trust is
the outcome of the expected action that can be exploited to fulfill
the trustor’s goal. In practice, the result may deviate from what is
expected and that will affect the relation between the trustor and
the trustee.
Suppose that trustor X can evaluate trustee Y of performing
task τ . The expected gain obtained by X is GˆX←Y(τ) if Y
accomplishes task τ . The expected damage suffered by X is
DˆX←Y(τ) if Y fails to do the task. The expected cost of X
is CˆX←Y(τ) regardless of Y ’s success or failure. The expected
result of Y executing task τ that can be exploited by X is
RˆX←Y(τ), which is a function of GˆX←Y(τ), DˆX←Y(τ) and
CˆX←Y(τ). The expected gain, damage and cost can be expressed
in terms of QoS/QoE parameters, such as delay, jitter, bandwidth,
packet loss, procurement cost, reliability, efficiency, users’ per-
spective of the overall value of the service provided, etc.
Trustor X has its goal GoalX. If the expected result is aligned
with the goal, e.g., RˆX←Y(τ) ⊆ GoalX, which means that the
expected result is a subset of the goal, trustor X delegates trustee
Y to do task τ . The outcome of Y ’s action that can reach X
is the actual result RX←Y(τ). The actual result may be different
from the expected result. Due to the lack of the expected outcomes
and/or the addition of side effects, the actual result may not be a
subset of the goal, i.e., RX←Y(τ) * GoalX. The expected gain
GˆX←Y(τ), damage DˆX←Y(τ) and cost CˆX←Y(τ) need to be
modified accordingly.
3.5 Context
Trust is context dependent. That is, the trustor trusts the trustee in
a specific context about its behavior. If the context is changed, the
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the ingredients and the process of trust.
trustor’s decision may be different. The context consists of two
components, i.e., the task type and the environment. In the social
IoT, trustor X may trust trustee Y for one task but not for another
one. The trustworthiness of an agent on performing one action
can be different from performing another one. The evaluation of
trustworthiness needs to be applicable to the specific task.
The environment is an external condition. In the trust process,
there is perceived risk in the uncertainty of the actions of the
autonomous agents as well as in the uncertainty of the envi-
ronment. Trustor X evaluates the trustees and makes decision
in a certain environment. The environment affects trustor X’s
evaluation process. The environment also affects how trustee Y
acts, whether intentional or not, and how it generates the result.
The trustworthiness of Y varies in different environments. In
the IoT, for example, the environment can be the supporting
infrastructure or the external interference. The trust process is
situated on both task type and environment.
The process of trust and all the ingredients are illustrated in
Fig. 1. The notion of trust is more than a single value such as
trustworthiness. It is a dynamic process which involves the trustor,
the trustee, and the circumstances rather than a static notion. Trust
contains not only a mental attitude, an evaluation and a decision
but also an action full of unexpected risks. In the following section,
based on the described model of trust, we will highlight the
limitations of some current approaches and clarify the distinctive
features of trust in the social IoT.
4 CLARIFICATION OF TRUST IN THE SOCIAL IOT
4.1 Mutuality of Trustor and Trustee
Trust Model Limitation 1. In the trust process, the trustor
performs a unilateral evaluation of the trustworthiness of the
trustee.
A unilateral evaluation means that only the trustor performs
evaluation on the trustee. It delegates tasks to the trustee with
expectations and risks. This limitation of the existing trust models
leads to a lack of protection of the trustee. The trustee may want to
evaluate the trustor’s trustworthiness in order not to be maliciously
exploited. For instance, Alice (the trustor) intends to utilize Bob’s
(the trustee) camera installed at Bob’s place. Alice entrusts Bob
with the ability of collecting information through his camera.
Meanwhile, Bob needs to make sure that Alice will not misuse
the installed camera.
In the social IoT, both the trustor and the trustee are cognitive
and the evaluation of trustworthiness is mutual so as to safeguard
both sides’ interests. Before a decision of delegation, trustor X
pre-evaluates potential trustees and identifies the best candidate
Y . Candidate Y performs a reverse evaluation towards X based
Fig. 2. Procedure of mutual evaluation on the trustee and the trustor.
on Y ’s own interest. If X passes the reverse evaluation, Y
becomes X’s trustee. Moreover, trustor X and trustee Y perform
mutual post-evaluations according to the action result and the
environment, which will subsequently affect the pre-evaluations
for the next delegation decision. The mutual evaluation can be
reflected in the following formulation of finding the trustee.
Y = argmax
y
TWX←y(τ)
subject to T˜W y←X(τ) ≥ θy(τ)
(1)
where TWX←y(τ) denotes the trustworthiness of potential trustee
y perceived by trustor X over task τ , T˜W y←X(τ) denotes the
reverse trustworthiness of trustor X perceived by potential trustee
y, and θy(τ) is a threshold set by y for the reverse evaluation. Only
when the trustworthiness of the reverse evaluation is no less than
θy(τ), the trustee regards trustor X as a trustworthy agent who
will not maliciously exploit resources and accepts the delegation
request. To evaluate the trustor, the trustee can use its log files
or usage pattern records to recognize how the trustor has used its
resources. For example, if someone rents a server to provide illegal
service, the server provider can detect it through its records.
Both pre-evaluation and post-evaluation in the social IoT are
mutual. The procedure of the mutual evaluation is illustrated
in Fig. 2. Firstly, the trustor makes a pre-evaluation of all the
potential trustees to delegate with task τ . It identifies potential
trustee 1 with the highest trustworthiness TWX←1(τ). Mean-
while, trustee 1 makes a reverse evaluation to compare the trust-
worthiness T˜W 1←X(τ) with its threshold θ1(τ). Suppose that
T˜W 1←X(τ) < θ1(τ) and trustee 1 refuses to provide the service
to trustor X . Secondly, upon rejection, trustor X chooses poten-
tial trustee 2 with the second best trustworthiness TWX←2(τ).
Suppose that, with reverse evaluation, trustee 2 agrees to provide
the service. Trustor X makes decision to delegate trustee 2 to do
task τ with expectations and risks. Trustee 2 acts and produces
the output, and trustor X acquires the result. Finally, both trustor
X and trustee 2 make post-evaluations based on the result and the
environment.
4.2 Inferential Transfer of Trust with Analogous Tasks
Trust Model Limitation 2. The trustor perceives the trustee’s
trustworthiness of performing a task as a single parameter that is
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unique to this specific task. Therefore, when the trustor wants to
delegate another task to the trustee, the trust based on the previous
task cannot be transferred.
As trust is context dependent, conventionally, trustworthiness
is unique to a specific task τ . TWX←Y(τ) indicates trustee Y ’s
chance of successfully performing task τ perceived by trustor
X . Numerous methods have been proposed to estimate the
trustworthiness value, taking into account various factors such
as competence, computation capability, willingness, and social
contact [20]. It is common for the trustor to use his experience
to calculate the trustworthiness that is based on the trustee’s past
performance of task τ . However, restricting any trustworthiness to
only one specific task is a limitation of the existing trust models.
In other words, when the trustor wants to delegate a new task to
the trustee, the trust based on previous tasks cannot be used to
infer the trustworthiness toward the new task.
Let us consider an example that Alice wants to check the real-
time traffic of a certain route. Bob claims that his smartphone can
provide the related data. Can Alice make a reasonable judgment
based on the past experience that Bob’s smartphone provided
the GPS and image data? If the existing models are used, the
answer is no. This is because GPS, image monitoring, and real-
time traffic are deemed as three unrelated tasks in the existing
models. Although the real-time traffic monitoring task requires
exactly the GPS and image information, it is considered as a new
task. Therefore, it has limits to treat each task as an inseparable
entity.
In the trust model for social IoT, task τ includes multiple
characteristics {aj(τ)}Jj=1, where aj(τ) denotes the jth charac-
teristic of task τ . Based on this model, the trustworthiness of a new
type of task τ ′ can be obtained from the existing trustworthiness
values, even though trustor X has not assigned τ ′ to trustee
Y previously. One can infer trustworthiness TWX←Y(τ ′) with
an inferring function f and the existing trustworthiness value
of TWX←Y(τ), if any characteristic ai(τ ′) of the new task is
included in the experienced task τ . That is, ∀i, ai(τ ′),∃j, aj(τ),
such that ai(τ ′) = aj(τ), the trustworthiness with task τ ′ can be
inferred as
TWX←Y(τ ′) = f (TWX←Y(τ)) . (2)
If the characteristics {ai(τ ′)}Ii=1 of new task τ ′ are included in
multiple previously experienced tasks {τk}Kk=1, the trustworthi-
ness with task τ ′ can be inferred from trustworthiness of all these
tasks as
TWX←Y(τ ′) = f (TWX←Y(τ1), . . . , TWX←Y(τK)) . (3)
Fig. 3 illustrates an example of how to infer the trustworthiness
of a new task from the trustworthiness of previously experienced
tasks. Different colors in the figure indicate different characteris-
tics. Assume that task τ1 includes only one characteristic which is
indicated by red color. Meanwhile, tasks τ2 and τ3 consist of two
characteristics, respectively. Hence, two different colors in each
of them. Trustor X requests trustee Y to do a new type of task,
τ4, whose characteristics are included in τ2 and τ3. Although the
trustor does not have direct experience of delegating τ4 to the
trustee, he can still infer the trustworthiness.
Given that different characteristics play different roles in
a task, each characteristic needs to be weighted to reflect its
importance in the task. Suppose that the ith characteristic in new
Fig. 3. An example of inferring trustworthiness of tasks. A task may
include multiple characteristics.
task τ ′ is weighted as wi(τ ′). Therefore, an implementation of the
inferring function f can be given as
TWX←Y(τ ′) =
∑
i
wi(τ
′)
∑
k wj(τk)TWX←Y(τk)∑
k wj(τk)
where ai(τ
′) = aj(τk). (4)
Here, it is assumed that multiple previous tasks {τk} have
characteristics aj(τk) that are the same as characteristic ai(τ ′)
in the new task. wj(τk) is a weight factor that repre-
sents the importance of the jth characteristic in task τk.
As characteristic aj(τk) is the same as characteristic ai(τ ′),∑
k wj(τk)TWX←Y(τk)/
∑
k wj(τk) denotes the weighted av-
erage of the existing trustworthiness toward characteristic ai(τ ′).
It is an estimation of how trustee Y would do with characteristic
ai(τ
′) in task τ ′. Eventually, TWX←Y(τ ′) is obtained as a
weighted sum of these estimations of the characteristics that
compose task τ ′.
The proposed trust model is a characteristic-based model,
which has a broad range of applications. It is suitable for the
applications with a task that requires a set of characteristics. For
example, the real-time traffic monitoring task requires the GPS,
the image data, and the velocity information. An agent can be
entrusted of a task if it can undertake all characteristics of the task.
The trustworthiness of different characteristics can be evaluated
through different previous tasks.
4.3 Transitivity of Trust
Trust Model Limitation 3. If Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts
Carlos, Alice can trust Carlos without restrictions.
Transitivity of trust in social IoT means that if agent X , who
requests the service, and agent Y , who provides it, are not linked
by a direct social relationship, the trustworthiness value can be
transferred via the intermediate social nodes [20]. In existing
models, the trustworthiness value of nonadjacent nodes X and
Y is computed as
TWX←Y =
∏
a,b∈PXY
TWa←b (5)
where PXY represents the sequence of nodes which constitute
the selected path from node X to node Y . The model is a good
simplification. Nevertheless, this model does not distinguish task
types. Neither does it differentiate the recommendation from the
task execution. Trust is simply transited as long as there is positive
trustworthiness value between any two sequential nodes in path
PXY . In other words, trust is transited without any restriction in
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Fig. 4. Transitivity of trust with respect to tasks of the same type.
the existing models. However, it has been demonstrated that in
real life trust is not always transitive but depends on the particular
service requested [29]. Therefore, to remedy this limitation, it is
better to model the transitivity with restrictions that are based on
the context.
Transitivity of the proposed trust model is obtained as a
function g of trustor X , trustee Y , path of intermediate nodes
PXY , and the type of task τ and its recommendation Rτ . That is
TWX←Y(τ) = g(X,Y,PXY , τ, Rτ ). (6)
The intermediate nodes provide recommendation rather than ser-
vice, as Rτ denotes the recommendation for task τ . The type of
the task is emphasized in the model and the trust transitivity is
discussed in the following two situations.
In the first situation, the type of the task does not change over
the transitivity path. If Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Carlos with
the same task type, how can Alice infer trustworthiness toward
Carlos of this task type? As illustrated in Fig. 4, trust of Alice
(A) toward Bob (B) is based on task of type 1 and that of Bob
(B) toward Carlos (C) is based on the task of the same type. The
transitivity is allowed. Trust can be transited when A regards B as
a competent intermediate node, i.e., TWA←B(Rτ ) ≥ ω1, and B
regards C as a suitable trustee, i.e., TWB←C(τ) ≥ ω2. Here, ω1
and ω2 are preset trustworthiness with relatively high values. The
transition of trust is given by
TWA←C(τ) = TWA←B(Rτ )TWB←C(τ)
+ (1− TWA←B(Rτ )) (1− TWB←C(τ))
= 1− TWA←B(Rτ )− TWB←C(τ)
+ 2 · TWA←B(Rτ )TWB←C(τ) (7)
It is included in (7) a part of the transitivity of trust, i.e.,
(1−TWA←B(Rτ ))(1−TWB←C(τ)), which is neglected in the
existing model (5). It represents a mistrust toward the intermediate
node multiplied by the incorrect judgment of the intermediate node
toward its predecessor. If the task types are different along the
path, the transitivity of trustworthiness may be blocked as in the
case of B ← C ← D in Fig. 4.
In the second situation, the task types along the transitivity
paths are different. However, these tasks have some common
characteristics. With the concepts in Section 4.2, two methods are
proposed here for calculating the transitivity of trust.
(1) Conservative Transitivity.
Trustworthiness can be inferred from the intermediate social
nodes only if all the characteristics of the new task are included in
the experienced tasks of the intermediate nodes. Take Fig. 5(a) as
an example. If Bob (B) trusts Carlos (C) with task τ and Carlos
Fig. 5. Transitivity of trust with respect to tasks that have multiple
characteristics. (a) Conservative Transitivity. (b) Aggressive Transitivity.
(C) trusts Dale (D) with task τ ′, Bob (B) can infer trustworthiness
toward Dale (D) with task τ ′′ when
{a(τ ′′)} ⊆ {a(τ)} ∩ {a(τ ′)}. (8)
The trustworthiness of task τ ′′ can be inferred as
TWB←C(Rτ ′′) = f(TWB←C(Rτ )) (9)
TWC←D(τ ′′) = f(TWC←D(τ ′)). (10)
The transitivity of trust is given by
TWB←D(τ ′′) = TWB←C(Rτ ′′)TWC←D(τ ′′)
+(1− TWB←C(Rτ ′′))(1− TWC←D(τ ′′))
when TWB←C(Rτ ′′) > ω1 and TWC←D(τ ′′)ω2. (11)
(2) Aggressive Transitivity.
Trustworthiness can be inferred from the intermediate social
nodes if any of the characteristics of the new task is included in
the experienced tasks of the intermediate nodes along a path and
all the characteristics are included in the experienced tasks of the
trustee. It means that the assessment of different characteristics of
a particular task can be done along different paths. Take Fig. 5(b)
as an example. Bob (B) trusts Carlos (C) and Carlos (C) trusts
Evan (E) with the same task τ . Bob (B) trusts Dale (D) and Dale
(D) trusts Evan (E) with the same task τ ′. Bob (B) can infer
trustworthiness toward Evan (E) with task τ ′′ when
{a(τ ′′)} ⊆ {a(τ)} ∪ {a(τ ′)}. (12)
Suppose that characteristics {a1} pass through path B ← C ←
E and characteristics {a2} through path B ← D ← E. The
trustworthiness of characteristics {a1} and {a2} of task τ ′′ can
be inferred as
TWB←C(Ra1(τ ′′)) = f(TWB←C(Rτ )) (13)
TWC←E(a1(τ ′′)) = f(TWC←E(τ)) (14)
TWB←D(Ra2(τ ′′)) = f(TWB←D(Rτ ′)) (15)
TWD←E(a2(τ ′′)) = f(TWD←E(τ ′)). (16)
Furthermore, the trustworthiness of the characteristics need to be
combined to establish the trustworthiness of task τ ′′. That is
TWB←E(τ ′′) = w1(τ ′′)TWB←E(a1(τ ′′))
+w2(τ
′′)TWB←E(a2(τ ′′)) (17)
where TWB←E(a1(τ ′′)) and TWB←E(a2(τ ′′)) can be obtained
with the transitivity equations similar to (7). The searching com-
plexity and communication overhead are larger of the Aggressive
Transitivity method than those of the Conservative Transitivity
method. Nevertheless, more potential trustees can be found with
the Aggressive Transitive method.
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4.4 Trustworthiness Updated with Delegation Results
Trust Model Limitation 4. It is not well modeled how the trust-
worthiness is updated with the results of previous task delegations.
There are two kinds of trustworthiness evaluation in the social
IoT. One is pre-evaluation and the other is post-evaluation. In most
of the existing trust models, the trustor modifies the trustworthi-
ness toward the trustee after task delegation. However, it is not
clear how the results that are fed back affect the evaluation in the
existing models.
The proposed trust model emphasizes on the various aspects
of the delegation results. It is reasonable to evaluate the trust-
worthiness with other factors in addition to the success rate. For
example, the energy of a social IoT node may be limited because it
is powered by a battery or a renewable energy source. The energy
consumption of previous tasks greatly impacts the willingness of
this node to undertake any more similar tasks. The factors of
delegation results can be classified into positive factor gain and
negative factors damage and cost [30]. Therefore, the normalized
post-evaluation of the trustworthiness is given by
TWX←Y(τ) = N
[
SˆX←Y(τ)GˆX←Y(τ)− (1− SˆX←Y(τ))
·DˆX←Y(τ)− CˆX←Y(τ)
]
(18)
where SˆX←Y(τ) denotes the expected success rate of trustee Y
completing task τ . GˆX←Y(τ) is the expected gain to trustor X
by assigning task τ to Y and Y completes the task. DˆX←Y(τ) is
the expected damage infringed to X by assigning task τ to Y but
Y fails the task. CˆX←Y(τ) is the expected cost of X delegating
task τ to Y regardless of the outcomes. N[·] denotes the normal-
ization operator that brings the trustworthiness value to a specified
range, e.g., [0, 1] or [−1, 1]. These expected results are updated
with the actual success rate SX←Y(τ), gain GX←Y(τ), damage
DX←Y(τ) and cost CX←Y(τ) of the current task delegation. That
is
SˆX←Y(τ) = βSˆ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)SX←Y(τ) (19)
GˆX←Y(τ) = βGˆ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)GX←Y(τ) (20)
DˆX←Y(τ) = βDˆ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)DX←Y(τ) (21)
CˆX←Y(τ) = βCˆ ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)CX←Y(τ) (22)
where •ˆ′ denotes the historical expected value and β is the
forgetting factor. It should be noted that β can be set to different
values in the above four updating equations.
The proposed model clarifies how to update the trustworthi-
ness according to the delegation results. Metrics of social rela-
tionships, such as friendship and community-interest, can be used
to calculate the initial values of the trustworthiness. For example,
socially cooperative nodes in the same community tend to provide
high performance. Since social relationship enhancement can be
considered as a kind of benefit or gain, it can be modeled and
included in the gain factor Gˆ(τ) in the proposed model. There are
some excellent existing works that detail how social relationships
can be involved in calculating the trustworthiness [4], [5].
If the trustworthiness value is large, the trustor is likely to get
positive net profit by delegating the task to the trustee. Without the
normalization in (18), some assignments may lead to positive net
profits while others may result in negative net profits. A rational
task assignment is the one that can bring the most expected profit.
Therefore, the best candidate to delegate task τ satisfies
Y = argmax
y
SˆX←y(τ)GˆX←y(τ)− (1− SˆX←y(τ))
·DˆX←y(τ)− CˆX←y(τ). (23)
With the proposed model of updating the trustworthiness with
the delegation results, it is easy to include the trustor itself as one
of the candidates to perform the task. In the social IoT, an agent
trusting others to accomplish a task does not necessarily mean
that the requester cannot do the job by himself [28]. Although the
agent has resource and capability to accomplish the task, he trusts
and delegates the task to others if there is more net profit. That is,
trustor X assigns task τ to trustee Y rather than do it himself if
SˆX←Y(τ)GˆX←Y(τ)− (1− SˆX←Y(τ))DˆX←Y(τ)− CˆX←Y(τ)
>
SˆX←X(τ)GˆX←X(τ)− (1− SˆX←X(τ))DˆX←X(τ)− CˆX←X(τ).
(24)
When an agent of the social IoT is entrusted with a task
request, he also has two options. He can either complete the
task or recommend and delegate to other agents to do it. The
decision is based on which option can bring more benefits to
himself. As the trustee evaluates the trustor, its own goal is
to obtain more gain and suffer less damage and cost. Usually,
the trustee’s gain includes earnings and reputation improvement.
The damage and cost include equipment amortization, energy
consumption, bandwidth occupation, etc. The reverse evaluation
can use a similar equation as (18).
4.5 Trustworthiness Affected by Dynamic Environment
Trust Model Limitation 5. The update of trustworthiness de-
pends entirely on the task delegation results without considering
the dynamic of the social IoT environment.
Since trust is context dependent, the update of trustworthiness
should be based on the delegation results as well as on the
context [28]. The context is an important factor that affects trust,
because it specifies the situation in which trust resides [10]. As
we stated before, the context consists of the task types and the
environment. The same environment that is safe to one agent/task
may be hostile to another agent/task. Given the dynamic nature
of a social IoT, the environment often changes and the threat
exposure may vary considerably over time [31]. Furthermore,
people behave differently in different situations such that the
devices associated with humans may change their behaviors in
different environments.
Dynamic environment means that the external condition
changes considerably. It is imperative to adjust trust assessment
and trustworthiness assignment accordingly. Chen et al. [5] in-
cluded a time factor in the trustworthiness update to adapt to the
environment variation. TrustorX utilizes its latest experience with
trustee Y and the previous trustworthiness values to update the
trustworthiness. However, it is not sufficient to model the effect of
the dynamic environment. For instance, it is more difficult for
any agent to accomplish a task in a hostile environment than
an amicable one. Hostile environment means that the external
condition is unsuitable and harmful for accomplishing the current
task. Amicable environment means that the external condition
is suitable and helpful for accomplishing the current task. It is
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reasonable for the trustor to update the trustworthiness of the
trustee with an extra reward if it accomplishes the task in a hostile
environment.
The instantaneous environment, i.e., the current external con-
dition, of trustor X is modeled as EX and the instantaneous
environment of trustee Y is modeled as EY. Suppose that I is the
set of the intermediate nodes that connect X and Y . The instan-
taneous environments of the intermediate nodes are modeled as
{Ei}, i ∈ I . In order to stabilize the trustworthiness updates, we
introduce a function r(·) to “remove” the environment influence
on the actual success rate, gain, damage, and cost perceived by the
trustor. Consequently, the update functions (19)–(22) are modified
as
SˆX←Y(τ) = βSˆ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)
r(EX, EY, {Ei}, SX←Y(τ)) (25)
GˆX←Y(τ) = βGˆ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)
r(EX, EY, {Ei}, GX←Y(τ)) (26)
DˆX←Y(τ) = βDˆ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)
r(EX, EY, {Ei}, DX←Y(τ)) (27)
CˆX←Y(τ) = βCˆ ′X←Y(τ) + (1− β)
r(EX, EY, {Ei}, CX←Y(τ)). (28)
Let us use a coarse example to illustrate how function r(·)
works. Suppose that the environment indicators EX, EY, and
{Ei} take real positive values in (0, 1] where a large number
represents amicable environment and a small number represents
hostile environment. Function r can be defined as
r(EX, EY, {Ei}, SX←Y(τ)) = SX←Y(τ)
min[EX, EY, {Ei}] . (29)
In this way, accomplishing a task in a hostile environment has
extra credit on trustworthiness. Here, the smallest value of the
instantaneous environment is used according to Cannikin Law
(Wooden Bucket Theory) because the worst environment has the
dominant influence.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Real-world Social Networks for Network Connectiv-
ity in Social IoT Simulations
We adopt three real-world social networks for network connectiv-
ity and perform simulations to evaluate the clarified trust models
for the social IoT. The network connectivity cases of the actual
Facebook network, Google+ network, and Twitter network are
used as the connectivity case of the simulated IoT.
The Facebook data were collected from survey participants
of Facebook users. The dataset includes node features (user
profiles) and circles (user’s friend lists with direct connections).
The Google+ data were collected from users who manually shared
their circles using the “share circle” feature. The Twitter data
were crawled from public sources. The dataset also includes node
features and circles [32].
Due to the complexity of these social networks, we use sub-
networks extracted from these real-world networks for simulations
of the social IoT. The connectivity characteristics of the sub-
networks are presented in Table 1. The degree of a node is the
number of edges that it connects to. The average degree of all the
nodes gives an overall indication of the degree of connectivity of
the network. The diameter is the largest number of steps of the
Fig. 6. Node devices of the experimental IoT network.
shortest paths between nodes in the network. The average path
length is the average number of steps of the shortest paths of all
pairs of nodes.
The clustering coefficient is given by the ratio of the number
of edges to the maximum possible number of edges in a node’s
direct neighborhood. Clustering coefficients indicate how nodes
are embedded in their neighborhood. The clustering coefficient,
along with the average path length, usually indicate a “small-
world” effect. The average clustering coefficient is the mean value
of the clustering coefficients of all the network nodes [33]. The
modularity values shown in Table 1 reveal that these three sub-
networks are loosely concentrated in modules (groups of densely
connected nodes) [34]. The number of communities (groups) of
each sub-network is also shown in Table 1 [35].
With each sub-network, we randomly select about 40% of the
nodes as trustors and about 40% of the nodes as trustees for a
social IoT. The social networks simulation platform is used to
verify the clarified trust models 1, 3, 4, and 5 in Sections 5.3, 5.5,
5.6, and 5.7, respectively.
5.2 Experiment Setup
Besides the real-world social networks platform, we carry out
experiments in an IoT network to test the proposed trust models.
Each node device in the IoT network is installed with the Texas
Instruments’ Z-Stark (version 2.5.0). The Z-Stack includes five
layers, i.e., the ZigBee Device Objects layer, the Application
Framework, the Application Support Sublayer, the ZigBee net-
work layer, and the ZMAC layer [36]. These layers support the
devices to construct a ZigBee network.
TABLE 1
Connectivity characteristics of the three sub-networks of social
networks.
Facebook Google+ Twitter
Number of Nodes 347 358 244
Number of Edges 5038 4178 2478
Average Degree 29.04 23.34 20.31
Diameter 11 12 8
Average Path Length 3.75 3.9 2.96
Average Clustering Coefficient 0.49 0.39 0.27
Modularity 0.46 0.45 0.38
Number of Communities 29 22 16
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The node devices used in our experiments have a size of
3.6×2.7 cm. It contains a CC2530 chip. The CC2530 is a system-
on-chip (SoC) solution for IEEE 802.15.4, Zigbee, and Radio Fre-
quency for Consumer Electronics (RF4CE) applications. It enables
robust network nodes that are built with very low total bill-of-
material costs. The CC2530 combines the excellent performance
of an RF transceiver with an industry-standard enhanced 8051
Microcontroller Unit (MCU). All the I/Os of the CC2530 chip are
available through 2.54 pin interfaces and can be used to extend the
function. Optical sensors are attached to the main boards by these
2.54 pin interfaces and used in Section 5.7. Each device uses a 2.4
GHz omnidirectional antenna. Its reliable transmission distance is
up to 250 meters, and the automatic reconnection distance is up
to 110 meters. Fig. 6 shows the node devices of the experimental
IoT network.
We establish an experimental IoT network that contains five
node groups. Each group includes two trustors, two honest
trustees, and two dishonest trustees. Besides, there is a coordinator
device that is configured to start the IEEE 802.15.4 network.
It is the first device on the network. The coordinator scans the
RF environment, chooses a channel and a network identifier, and
starts the network. At the end of each experiment, the coordinator
collects the data and sends them back to the host computer through
a CP2102 chip for further analysis. The CP2102 is a highly
integrated USB serial port conversion module.
The experiment platform is used to verify the clarified trust
models 2, 4, and 5 in Sections 5.4, 5.6, and 5.7, respectively.
5.3 Mutuality in Trust Model
In order to evaluate the trust model with mutuality of trustor
and trustee, a trustor is assigned a trustworthiness value by its
potential trustee through reverse evaluation. The trustworthiness
value represents how the trustor would use the trustees resources
legitimately and responsively. It is based on the trustees previous
experience with the trustor. The better the previous usage (less
abusive), the greater the trustworthiness value through the reverse
evaluation. Any potential trustee y holds a threshold θy(τ) for
task τ . It only accepts delegation requests from the trustors whose
trustworthiness values are greater than θy(τ).
In the simulation, we assign each trustor a trustworthiness
value which is a random number in [0, 1]. If this value is high,
the trustor uses the trustee’s resources responsively with a high
probability. If this value is low, the trustor behaves maliciously
and uses the trustee’s resources abusively with a high probability.
We assume that the reverse evaluation is performed based on the
statistics of the trustor’s previous responsive or abusive uses of the
trustee’s resources. For task τ , potential trustee y sets a threshold
θy(τ) that is equal to 0, 0.3, or 0.6. When θy(τ) = 0, it means
that the trustee accepts delegation requests from any trustor. This is
equivalent to the case of unilateral evaluation that only the trustor
evaluates the trustee.
Fig. 7 shows the success rate, unavailable rate, and abuse
rate of one delegating task τ to another in the sub-networks of
Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. The success rate is the ratio of
the number of successful task delegations to the total number of
delegation requests. The unavailable rate is the ratio of the number
of unanswered requests to the total number of requests. Some
trustors may not find any trustee to accept task τ because of the
low trustworthiness values in the reverse evaluations. With task
delegations, the abuse rate is the ratio of the number of abusive
uses to the number of all uses of the trustees’ resources.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of success rates, unavailable rates, and abuse rates
of task delegations with different threshold value θy(τ) in the reverse
evaluations.
It is revealed in the figure that, if the trustees do not perform
the reverse evaluation and accept all requests, i.e., θy(τ) = 0, the
abuse rates are more than 0.4 in the three networks. As the thresh-
old θy(τ) increases, the unavailable rates increase and the abuse
rates decrease across all networks. Some vicious nodes cannot
obtain services when the trustees execute rigorous assessments in
the reverse evaluations. There are some differences in the results
among these three networks. This is because the structures of
Facebook, Google+ and Twitter are different. For example, the
average degree is 29.04 for Facebook, 23.34 for Google+, and
20.31 for Twitter.
5.4 Inferential Transfer of Trust in Trust Model
The proposed trust model traces down to the multiple character-
istics within a task. It allows the trustworthiness of a new task to
be inferred from the analogous tasks. Once a malicious trustee
behaves poorly on one task, it affects subsequent evaluations
of this trustee with other types of tasks that contain the same
characteristics.
To test the effectiveness of the proposed trust model, we
use the experiment platform of the IoT network described in
Section 5.2. Each of the trustors requests a task that contains two
characteristics. The characteristics are also included in different
previous tasks. Dishonest trustees have performed maliciously
with a particular characteristic on the previous task. And, the
trustors make a judgment that the dishonest trustees are not as
competent as the honest trustees with that characteristic.
The experiment runs for 50 times, and the result is shown in
Fig. 8. The trustors choose the trustees with two different methods.
First, the trustors infer the trustworthiness of the trustees on the
task with the analogous tasks the trustees performed previously.
This is the proposed trust model (marked as With Proposed Model
in Fig. 8). Second, the trustors deem the task as a completely new
task and do not infer any trustworthiness values from previous
experiences (marked as Without Proposed Model in Fig. 8). At
the end of an experiment run, each trustor sends a report message
to the coordinator, which contains the identifier of the selected
trustee. A trustor may choose an honest or dishonest node device
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the percentages of honest devices.
as its trustee. The coordinator calculates the percentage of the
trustors that have chosen the honest trustees.
As shown in the figure, the percentage of the trustors that
have selected honest devices as the trustees for the task is higher
when we use the proposed trust model. The trustors select proper
trustees with a high probability because they can reasonably infer
trustworthiness of a trustee on performing a new task with the
previous experiences. If a trustee performed maliciously on a
previous task, it is hard to gain sufficient trust to perform the
analogous tasks.
5.5 Transitivity in Trust Model
In order to find out how the context affects the trust transitivity
based on the proposed trust model, we simulate a scenario where
there are multiple types of tasks in the network. Each task consists
of one or two characteristics. Every network node keeps the
trustworthiness records of two different tasks. The characteristics
of these tasks are randomly assigned in the simulation. The total
number of different characteristics of the tasks in the network is
set to be 4, 5, 6, or 7.
Each trustor randomly generates a task delegation request.
With the conservative transitivity method, it sends out the dele-
gation request to intermediate nodes who have recommended and
potential trustees who have accomplished tasks that contain all the
characteristics of the task. When an intermediate node receives the
delegation request, it relays the request to the proper trustees or
the next intermediate nodes. When a potential trustee receives the
request, it responds. With the aggressive transitivity method, the
trustor sends out the delegation request to intermediate nodes who
have recommended and potential trustees who have accomplished
tasks that contain a part of the characteristics of the task. When
an intermediate node receives the delegation request, it relays the
request to the proper trustees or the next intermediate nodes. When
a potential trustee receives the request, it waits for a preset period.
The same trustee may receive other delegation requests originated
from the trustor. If all the characteristics of the task are covered
in these requests, the trustee responds. By this time, the trustee’s
capability of every characteristic of the task can be recommended
to the trustor. The trustor delegates the task to the trustee that
has the highest trustworthiness value on this task. Here, we only
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the success rates.
consider unilateral evaluation from the trustor toward the potential
trustee in order not to mix the performances of different features
of the trust model.
For comparison, a traditional trust transfer method is also used.
In this method, the trustworthiness can only be inferred from a
potential trustee that has accomplished the exact same task or
transferred through an intermediate node that recommends the
exact same task. The trustor sends out delegation requests only
to these potential trustees and intermediate nodes. Therefore, the
search is narrowed, and the trustor will find less potential trustees
with the traditional method.
For every task, a random number in [0, 1] is assigned to each
network node to indicate its actual competence and willingness
to accomplish the task. If this task has two characteristics, this
random number reveals the node’s capability of handling each
characteristic. For a particular node in the social IoT, neighboring
nodes that have direct experiences with it will establish the trust-
worthiness of this node that approaches its actual capability. The
trustworthiness will be transferred to other network nodes with
the traditional, conservative transitivity, or aggressive transitivity
method.
For task delegations according to the trustworthiness values,
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the average success rates and the average
unavailable rates with different trust transitivity methods over
network models of Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. The success
rates decrease and the unavailable rates increase as the number
of characteristics in the network increases. This is because it is
getting harder for the trustors to encounter the intermediate nodes
and find the potential trustees with the same task context.
The task delegation processes with the methods of conserva-
tive trust transitivity and aggressive trust transitivity have better
performance than the processes with the traditional trust transfer
method. In Fig. 9, the solid green and dash blue curves are above
the dash-dot red curves. Compared with the traditional method, the
aggressive trust transitivity method has an improvement of more
than 0.2 in success rate. In Fig. 10, the solid green and dash blue
curves are below the dash-dot red curves. The aggressive trust
transitivity has an improvement of more than 0.3 in unavailable
rate. This is because a trustor can find more potential trustees
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based on the two proposed trust transitivity methods. Meanwhile,
the aggressive transitivity method slightly outperforms the con-
servative transitivity method because the former can guarantee
that a trustor find even more potential trustees. This trend is
revealed in Fig. 11. The more potential trustees a trustor can find to
delegate a task, the better chance that the task can be successfully
accomplished.
To further evaluate the proposed models on the transitivity of
trust, we use some real-world node properties of the three social
networks to represent task characteristics. The task delegation pro-
cesses have results that are consistent with the random simulations.
The success rates, the unavailable rates, and the average numbers
of potential trustees are summarized in Table 2. It shows that
the conservative transitivity and aggressive transitivity methods
outperform the traditional trust transfer method. Take the Face-
book subnetwork as an example, compared with the traditional
method, the success rate increases to 57.89% and 67.11% from
27.63% with conservative transitivity and aggressive transitivity,
respectively. And, the unavailable rate decreases to 37.50% and
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Fig. 12. Comparison of the numbers of inquired nodes with different trust
transitivity methods.
26.97% from 66.45% with conservative transitivity and aggressive
transitivity, respectively.
The task delegation with aggressive transitivity of trust has
the best performance. However, it suffers from the largest search
overhead. The method with aggressive transitivity may involve
network nodes that only have a portion of the characteristics of a
task. These nodes cannot accomplish the task themselves but work
as intermediate nodes. Extra effort is required to communicate
with these nodes. Fig. 12 illustrates the search overheads with
different methods of trust transfer based on the Facebook subnet-
work. The search overhead is reflected in the number of network
nodes that a trustor will interrogate to find its potential trustees.
The Aggressive curve represents the number of network nodes
that the trustor communicates with, and each node has at least
one related characteristic of the task. The method of aggressive
transitivity of trust increases the number of a trustor’s potential
trustees. This is achieved with a cost of larger search overhead,
i.e., the trustor interrogates more network nodes.
5.6 Trustworthiness with Delegation Results in Trust
Model
In this simulation, we assign each potential trustee random values
of the expected success rate, gain, damage, and cost. The random
values are in [0, 1]. The trustee behaves according to the success
rate. If the trustee accomplishes the task successfully, the trustor
TABLE 2
Comparison of success rates, unavailable rates, and average numbers
of potential trustees with real-world network node properties.
Metric Facebook Google+ Twitter
Success rate 27.63% 28.39% 22.86%
Trad. Unavailable rate 66.45% 60.00% 73.33%
Num. potential trustees 4.19 2.37 2.88
Success rate 57.89% 53.55% 48.57%
Cons. Unavailable rate 37.50% 32.90% 45.71%
Num. potential trustees 10.63 5.92 5.99
Success rate 67.11% 59.35% 52.38%
Aggr. Unavailable rate 26.97% 26.45% 35.24%
Num. potential trustees 11.60 6.53 6.35
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Fig. 13. Comparison of the net profits with iterative trustworthiness
updates.
obtains the gain but pays the cost. If the trustee fails to complete
the task, the trustor suffers the damage and pays the cost. Every
trustor selects its trustee among the potential trustees for task
delegation with two strategies. With the first strategy, the trustor
only considers the success rates and delegates the task to the
trustee with the highest success rate. With the second strategy, as
described in Section 4.4, the trustor evaluates the potential trustees
based not only on the success rate but also on the gain, damage,
and cost. According to the task delegation results, the trustor
updates the success rate, gain, damage, and cost that correspond
to the task and that particular trustee node.
Fig. 13 shows the average net profits of task delegations in the
subnetworks of Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. With a forgetting
factor β = 0.1, the success rate, gain, damage, and cost values
are updated with iterations of continuous task delegations. The
average net profits are derived from the success rate, gain, damage,
and cost and converge after many iterations. For every subnetwork,
a better net profit is obtained if the trustor evaluates the potential
trustees with the second strategy, i.e., considering the success
rate, gain, damage, and cost values. With the first strategy, the
simulation results in the subnetworks of Facebook and Twitter
even show negative net profits.
The experimental IoT network described in Section 5.2 is used
to demonstrate how the proposed trust model deals with malicious
behaviors. In the proposed model, the trustworthiness is evaluated
with four different aspects, i.e., success rate, gain, damage, and
cost. It prevents the malicious nodes from promoting only a single
aspect’s value. It is common that some IoT devices are sensitive to
energy consumption. These IoT devices try their best to conserve
energy and extend the lifetime. Usually, they stay in sleep mode
and change to active mode only when it is necessary. The energy
consumption can be modeled as the cost.
In this experiment, the dishonest trustees send some fragment
packages to prolong the interaction time with the trustors. The
trustors choose trustees with two different methods. First, the
trustors choose proper trustees based on both the gain and the
cost (marked as With Proposed Model in Fig. 14). Second, the
trustors choose the trustees based only on the gain (marked as
Without Proposed Model in Fig. 14).
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During the experiment, each trustor requests 50 tasks. The
average active time of the trustors is shown in Fig. 14. As time
goes on, the trustors using the proposed trust model can detect
the malicious trustees, because the active time is much longer
than usual. As a result, the trustors do not choose those dishonest
trustees anymore and the average active time is shortened. Without
the proposed model, however, the active time remains long over
many tasks. The experiment result reveals that the proposed trust
model can be used to effectively identify malicious behaviors and
thereby exclude malicious nodes.
5.7 Trustworthiness with Dynamic Environment in
Trust Model
We simulate an update process of the trustworthiness taking into
account the influence of a dynamic environment. Only the update
of the success rate (25) is used here to demonstrate how the
changing environment affects the results. For a random pair of
trustor and trustee, Fig. 15 shows the success rates of delegating a
particular task τ that are updated over iterations with a forgetting
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Fig. 16. Comparison of the net profits when the light condition changes
and the dishonest trustees do not accept requests initially.
factor β = 0.1. All the data points are averaged over 100
independent simulation runs.
The trustor initializes the expected success rate as 1. A value of
SX←Y(τ) = 0.8 is assigned to the trustee to represent its actual
competence and willingness to accomplish the task. The trustor
delegates the task to the trustee and updates the expected success
rate according to the results. During the first 100 update iterations,
the environment is perfect and the instantaneous environments of
the trustor and the trustee are equal to 1, i.e., EX = EY = 1.
The expected success rates converge to 0.8. During the second
100 update iterations, the environment deteriorates and EX =
EY = 0.4. During the third 100 update iterations, the environment
partially recovers such that EX = EY = 0.7.
In the figure, the blue circles represent the expected success
rates without the environment influence. These rates converge to
0.8 which is the actual competence and willingness of the trustee
for task τ . When the instantaneous environments change, the suc-
cess rates change to SX←Y(τ)·min[EX, EY] = 0.8×0.4 = 0.32
or 0.8× 0.7 = 0.56.
The red squares show that, when the results are affected by
the environment, how the expected success rates are updated
according to the traditional method. The traditional method does
not distinguish the environment’s variation from the task delega-
tion results. It takes quite some time for the traditional method
to converge to the expected success rate when the environment
suddenly changes. Error and delay exist before convergence.
The green triangles show the expected success rates that are
updated with a function r(·) as in (29) to counter the environ-
mental influence. The expected success rates quickly track to the
environment changes. In general, the instantaneous environments,
EX and EY, may not be difficult to obtained. For example, these
values reflect channel bandwidth, network workload, processing
power, interference and noise, etc. Nevertheless, it is relatively
hard to construct the function r(·) that models how the environ-
ment affects the task delegation results.
In the experiment, we use the experimental IoT network
described in Section 5.2. The node devices are installed with the Z-
Stack and equipped with optical sensors. The trust model with the
dynamic environment factor is applied to distinguish the normal
behaviors in a hostile environment from the malicious behaviors.
With the optical sensors, the performance of the trustee node
is affected by the lighting condition. For example, this can be the
case in image acquisition. In the experiment, there is a period of
sufficient light followed by a dark period, and then it becomes light
again. The normal trustees serve the entire period and perform
poorly in the dark situation. The malicious trustees serve only
during the last light period. They behave maliciously from time to
time, but the overall performance is better than that of the normal
trustees performing in the dark. With a forgetting factor β = 0.1,
the trustors give the malicious trustees better evaluations, because
the accumulated performance of the normal trustees is worse.
Fig. 16 shows the net profit of the network with or without the
proposed trust model. With the proposed trust model, the trustors
can remove the environment factor and appropriately evaluate
the normal trustees during the dark period. Over the last light
period, more and more normal trustees are selected which replace
the malicious trustees. Therefore, the net profit returns to a high
level. Without the proposed trust model, the trustworthiness of the
normal trustees declines due to the poor performance during the
dark period. They are not selected during the last light period, and
the malicious trustees lower the net profit.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
For the social IoT, a new model of trust among objects is proposed,
and concepts of trust are clarified that overcome the limitations of
the existing trust models. The trust in the social IoT is depicted
as a dynamic process. It has a relational construct of six basic
ingredients, i.e., (1) the trustor, (2) the trustee, (3) the goal,
(4) the evaluation of trustworthiness, (5) the decision and its
subsequent action and result, and (6) the context. The distinctive
features of the trust model are clarified in five aspects, i.e., (1)
mutuality of trustor and trustee, (2) inferential transfer of trust
with analogous tasks, (3) transitivity of trust, (4) trustworthiness
updated with delegation results, and (5) trustworthiness affected
by dynamic environment. When the network interaction is based
on the proposed trust model, the performance of the social IoT
improves. Simulations are conducted on the specific social IoT
with network connectivity follows real-world social networks such
as Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. Experiments are carried out
on an experimental IoT network. The performance improvement is
reflected in decreased abuse rates of task delegations with the trust
mutuality model as well as increased success rates and decreased
unavailable rates with the trust transitivity model. The proposed
methods of interaction also increase the net profits of the users and
make network agents quickly adapt to a changing environment.
In the proposed trust model, the trustor and trustee perform
the bilateral evaluation of the trustworthiness. Therefore, the
vicious trustor cannot easily obtain services, and the malicious
trustee cannot easily involve in trustors’ tasks. Trustor and trustee
evaluate each other on four different aspects, i.e., success rate,
gain, damage, and cost, which can prevent the malicious nodes
from promoting only a single aspect’s value. Also, this model is
a characteristic-based model. Once the malicious trustee behaves
maliciously in a task, it can affect subsequent evaluations of many
other types of tasks which contain one or more the same charac-
teristics. It means that the proposed model can detect malicious
behavior effectively. Finally, the calculation of the trustworthiness
in our model considers the dynamic environment, which can
distinguish the normal behavior in a hostile environment from the
malicious behavior.
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